Latin American Studies

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

CASE CONCERNING MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA

(NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

AFFIDAVIT OF EDGAR CHAMORRO

September 5, 1985

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City of Washington)
) ss:
District of Columbia)

I, EDGAR CHAMORRO, being first duly sworn, depose and say the following:

1. I am a citizen of Nicaragua. I was born in Granada, Nicaragua on July 23, 1931. I presently reside in the United States of America with my wife and two children, at 640 Allendale Road, Key Biscayne, Florida. I have applied to the Government of the United States for permanent resident status so that I can live permanently in the United States. I am currently awaiting final action on my application. I have been advised by my attorneys that I should not travel outside the United States until my application for permanent resident status is formally approved; travel outside the United States at the present time, according to my attorneys, could prejudice my application and result in my being permanently excluded from the United States. Since I am unable to appear in person before the International Court of Justice, I submitting my testimony to the Court in written form.

2. I will begin by describing my background. I was raised in Nicaragua. At the age of 19, I joined the Jesuit order of the Roman Catholic Church, and subsequently became a Roman Catholic priest. I studied at the following Jesuit-affiliated institutions: Catholic University in Quito, Ecuador; St. Louis University in St. Louis, Missouri; and Marquette University in

Milwaukee, Wisconsin. I later served as full professor and Dean of the School of Humanities at the University of Central America, a Jesuit-affiliated institution in Managua, Nicaragua. I left the priesthood in 1969, but continued my career in education. In 1972, I received a Master's Degree in Education from Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

3. I returned to live in Managua, and went into private business. I worked for an advertising agency called Creative Publicity. I developed an expertise in advertising, public relations and mass communications. In 1977, I was appointed by the Nicaraguan Government to be a member of the Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations in New York. I served in that capacity for one year, after which I returned to Nicaragua. In June 1979, I took up residence with my family in Miami, Florida. At that time, there was a full-fledged insurrection against the Government, and the Guardia Nacional ("National Guard"), the Nicaraguan armed forces loyal to the President, General Anastasio Somoza, were bombing residential neighborhoods and shooting innocent civilians in the streets. I did not wish to remain in Nicaragua under such conditions.

4. On July 19, 1979, the insurrection succeeded in overthrowing the Somoza Government and a new Government of National Reconstruction was established in its place. The new government was led by the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) or "FSLN," which favored broad social and economic change in Nicaragua. I traveled back to Nicaragua in September 1979 to learn about the new government first-hand, and to decide whether to move back to

Nicaragua with my family. Although I, too, favored social and economic changes in Nicaragua, I felt then -- and still feel -- that the policies and programs of the FSLN were and are too radical, and that I could not lend my support to a government dominated by that political party. I decided to remain in Miami.

5. Toward the end of 1979 I began to work with a group of Nicaraguan exiles living in Miami who, like me, opposed the policies of the new government. In 1980 we constituted ourselves as the Union Democratica Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan Democratic Union), or "U.D.N." Our principal activity was to write letters to members of the United States Congress urging them to vote against financial assistance for the Nicaraguan Government. We also held political meetings and rallies with other like-minded Nicaraguan exiles in Miami, and we set up regional committees in other cities of the United States where substantial numbers of Nicraguans were residing. The leader of our organization, with whom I worked closely, was Jose Francisco Cardenal. Cardenal had served briefly as Vice President of the Council of State, the legislature of the new Nicaraguan Government, but had resigned his post and left Nicaragua because of his disagreements with the new government's policies.

6. In 1981, the U.D.N. underwent a transformation. During the first half of the year, Cardenal was contacted by representatives of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and he began to have frequent meetings with them in Washington and in Miami. He also began to receive monetary payments from these people. He was told that the United States Government

was prepared to help us remove the F.S.L.N. from power in Nicaragua, but that, as a condition for receiving this help, we had to join forces with the ex-National Guardsmen who had fled to Honduras when the Somoza Government fell and had been conducting sporadic raids on Nicaraguan border positions ever since. Cardenal was taken to Honduras by his C.I.A. contacts on several occasions to meet with these Guardsmen. The U.D.N., including Cardenal, initially opposed any linkage with the Guardsmen. The C.I.A., and high-ranking United States Government officials, insisted that we merge with the Guardsmen. Lt. General Vernon Walters, then a special assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State (and formerly Deputy Director of the C.I.A.) met with Cardenal to encourage him to accept the C.I.A's proposal. We were well aware of the crimes the Guardsmen had committed against the Nicaraguan people while in the service of President Somoza, and we wanted nothing to do with them. However, we recognized that without help from the United States Government we had no chance of removing the Sandinistas from power, so we eventually acceded to the C.I.A.'s, and General Walters', insistence that we join forces with the Guardsmen. Some U.D.N. members resigned because they would not associate themselves with the National Guard under any circumstances, but Cardenal and I and others believed the C.I.A.'s assurances that we, the civilians, would control the Guardsmen in the new organization that was to be created.

7. At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest of the bands, headed by Enrique Bermudez, a former Colonel, was called the 15th of September Legion. The

bands were poorly armed and equipped, and thoroughly disorganized. They were not an effective military force and represented no more than a minor irritant to the Nicaraguan Government. Prior to the U.D.N.'s merger with these people, General Walters himself arranged for all of the bands to be incorporated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers. The merger of the U.D.N. with the 15th of September Legion was accomplished in August 1981 at a meeting in Guatemala City, Guatemala, where formal documents were signed. The meeting was arranged and the documents were prepared by the C.I.A. The new organization was called the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense ("Nicaraguan Democratic Force") or, by its Spanish acronym, F.D.N. It was to be headed by a political junta, consisting of Cardenal, Aristides Sanchez (a politician loyal to General Somoza and closely associated with Bermudez) and Mariano Mendoza, formerly a labor leader in Nicaragua; the political junta soon established itself in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, taking up residence in a house rented for it by the C.I.A. Bermudez was assigned to head the military general staff, and it, too, was based in Honduras. The name of the organization, the members of the political junta, and the members of the general staff were all chosen or approved by the C.I.A.

8. Soon after the merger, the F.D.N. began to receive a substantial and steady flow of financial, military and other assistance from the C.I.A. Former National Guardsmen who had sought exile in El Salvador, Guatemala and the United States

after the fall of the Somoza Government were recruited to enlarge the military component of the organization. They were offered regular salaries, the funds for which were supplied by the C.I.A. Training was provided by Argentinian military officers, two of whom -- Col. Oswaldo Rivero and Col. Santiago Villejas -- I got to know quite well; the Argentinians were also paid by the C.I.A. A special unit was created for sabotage, especially demolitions; it was trained directly by C.I.A. personnel at Lepaterique, near Tegucigalpa. Arms, ammunition, equipment and food were supplied by the C.I.A. Our first combat units were sent into Nicaraguan territory in December 1981, principally to conduct hit-and-run raids. The first military successes of the organization came in March 1982, when C.I.A.-trained saboteurs blew up two vital bridges in northern Nicaragua -- at Rio Negro and Ocotal.

9. 1982 was a year of transition for the F.D.N. From a collection of small, disorganized and ineffectual bands of ex-National Guardsmen, the F.D.N. grew into a well-organized, well-armed, well-equipped and well-trained fighting force of approximately 4,000 men capable of inflicting great harm on Nicaragua. This was due entirely to the C.I.A., which organized, armed, equipped, trained and supplied us. After the initial recruitment of ex-Guardsmen from throughout the region (to serve as officers or commanders of military units), efforts were made to recruit "foot soldiers" for the force from inside Nicaragua. Some Nicaraguans joined the force voluntarily, either because of dissatisfaction with the Nicaraguan Government, family ties with leaders of the force, promises of food, clothing, boots and weapons, or a combination of these reasons. Many other members

of the force were recruited forcibly. F.D.N. units would arrive at an undefended village, assemble all the residents in the town square and then proceed to kill -- in full view of the others -- all persons suspected of working for the Nicaraguan Government or the F.S.L.N., including police, local militia members, party members, health workers, teachers, and farmers from government-sponsored cooperatives. In this atmosphere, it was not difficult to persuade those able-bodied men left alive to return with the F.D.N. units to their base camps in Honduras and enlist in the force. This was, unfortunately, a widespread practice that accounted for many recruits. The F.D.N. received all of its weapons from the C.I.A. In 1982, the C.I.A. provided FAL rifles to all F.D.N. combatants. These were acquired used from the Honduran army, which found these rifles expendable after the United States Government reequipped the Honduran army with American-made M-16 rifles, thus enabling the C.I.A. to purchase the FALs for the F.D.N. (Later, in 1983, the C.I.A. acquired AK-47 assault rifles for the F.D.N.)

Training continued under the direction of Argentinian military officers, although gradually the Argentinians were replaced and C.I.A. personnel performed all military training themselves. By the end of 1982, we were ready to launch our first major military offensive designed to take and hold Nicaraguan territory, which the C.I.A. was urging us to do. Our principal objective was the town of Jalapa, in northern Nicaragua. More than 1,000 of our fighters were involved, and we used light artillery (mortars, supplied by the C.I.A.) in combat for the first time. Although

we inflicted casualties on the Sandinistas and caused substantial destruction in Jalapa and other neighboring towns, our offensive was repulsed and we were forced to retreat to Honduras and regroup without having accomplished our objective.

10. My specific job during the first year after the creation of the F.D.N. was to serve as staff person to the political junta. I was based in Miami, where I did political propaganda work, wrote letters, organized rallies, set up committees in various parts of the United States and generally worked at building support for our cause within the United States. During this period Cardenal grew increasingly unhappy over his lack of influence within the F.D.N. He had frequent conflicts with the C.I.A. personnel who were supervising and directing the F.D.N.'s political and military activities and found that he had no control over Bermudez or the other members of the F.D.N. general staff, who answered only to the C.I.A. Eventually he quit the organization, returned to Miami and entered the insurance business.

11. In November 1982 I was approached by a C.I.A. agent using the name "Steve Davis" and asked to become a member of the "political directorate" of the F.D.N., which the C.I.A. had decided to create as a substitute for the "political junta." (I am able to refer to "Davis" by name because I know that it is a pseudonym; United States law makes it a criminal offense to reveal the real name of any undercover C.I.A. operative). I had lunch with "Davis" at a restaurant near my home in Florida. "Davis" told me he was speaking in the name of the President of the United States, who wanted "to get rid of the Sandinistas."

"Davis" explained to me that the F.D.N. had a bad image in the United States, and particularly among members of the Congress, because it was perceived as an organization of ex-National Guardsmen. He told me that in order to maintain the support of the Congress for the C.I.A's activities it was necessary to replace the political junta with a group of prominent Nicaraguan civilians who had no ties with the National Guard or the Somoza Government. "Davis" left without asking me to make a commitment. He told me I would be contacted again in the near future.

12. Later that month, "Davis" telephoned me and asked me to have dinner with him in his hotel suite at the Holiday Inn in Miami. When I arrived, "Davis" introduced me to another C.I.A. man, who used the name "Tony Feldman." "Feldman" was introduced as "Davis'" superior from Washington, and he acted as though "Davis" worked for him. "Feldman" told me that the C.I.A. had decided on a seven-member political directorate for the F.D.N., because any larger group would be unmanageable. He said that I had been selected as one of the seven, and he asked me to accept. He told me that the United States Government was prepared to give its full backing to the F.D.N. so that, by the end of 1983, we would be marching into Managua to take over the Nicaraguan Government. I was glad to see that the United States Government was committed enough to our cause to be taking such an active role, and I agreed to join the directorate they were creating. Over the next several days "Feldman" took control of the operation and moved the headquarters to the Four Ambassadors Hotel, also in Miami, where we met constantly. "Feldman" and his

assistants discussed with me possible candidates for the directorate, but it was obvious that they had already decided who they wanted. The most important thing, "Feldman" emphasized, was that the directorate be formed immediately. He told me that the C.I.A. was worried that the Congress might enact legislation to prohibit the use of United States funds for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government, and that the creation of a political directorate composed of prominent, respectable civilians might persuade the Congress not to enact such legislation.

14. The press conference was held the next day, December 8, 1982, at the Hilton Conference Center in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. We filed in and introduced ourselves as the directorate of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (F.D.N.), and then I read our statement of principles and goals. A C.I.A. officer named "George" had rewritten our original version of the statement, and I had to read his words. In January 1983, at the instruction of C.I.A. agent "Thomas Castillo," we put out a 12-point "peace initiative" drafted by the C.I.A., which essentially demanded the surrender of the Sandinista government. I thought this was premature, but "Castillo" insisted that it be done to get the F.D.N. favorable publicity. Also at this time, another Nicaraguan civilian -- Adolfo Calero -- who had just left Nicaragua, was added to the directorate. Calero had been working for the C.I.A. in Nicaragua for a long time. He served as, among other things, a conduit of funds from the United States Embassy to various student and labor organizations. "Feldman" had told me that the C.I.A. was bringing him out of Nicaragua, where he

had run the local Coca-Cola distributorship, to serve on the F.D.N.'s political directorate. Despite these public relations efforts, the United States Congress enacted a prohibition on C.I.A. efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, although it appropriated millions of dollars to the C.I.A. for clandestine military and paramilitary activities against the Nicaraguan Government. Before this prohibition was enacted, the C.I.A. agents we worked with spoke openly and confidently about replacing the government in Managua. Thereafter, the C.I.A. instructed us that, if asked, we should say that our objective was to interdict arms supposedly being smuggled from Nicaragua to El Salvador. If any of us ever said anything publicly about overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government, we would be visited immediately by a C.I.A. official who would say, "That's not the language we want you to use." But our goal, and that of the C.I.A. as well (as we were repeatedly assured in private), was to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, and to replace the Sandinistas as a government. It was never our objective to stop the supposed flow of arms, of which we never saw any evidence in the first place. The public statements by United States Government officials about the arms flow, we were told by the C.I.A. agents with whom we worked, were necessary to maintain the support of the Congress and should not be taken seriously by us.

15. From January 1983 through June 1984, I worked for the F.D.N. full time and remained a member of the political directorate until November 1984. The C.I.A. paid me a salary of $2,000 a month to support myself and my family, plus expenses.

Similar arrangements were made with the other F.D.N. "directors". I was put in charge of public relations for the F.D.N. We wanted to set up highly visible headquarters in a shopping center or office building, but the C.I.A. did not like the idea. They said it would become a target for demonstrations or violence. They insisted that we take an elegant suite at the David Williams Hotel in Coral Gables, Florida which the C.I.A. paid for.

16. At the end of January 1983, I was instructed to relocate to Tegucigalpa, Honduras to establish and manage the F.D.N.'s communications office. The C.I.A. station in Tegucigalpa, which at that time included about 20 agents working directly with the F.D.N., gave me money, in cash, to hire several writers, reporters, and technicians to prepare a monthly bulletin called "Comandos," to run a clandestine radio station, and to write press releases. I was also given money by the C.I.A. to rent a house, office space and automobiles and to obtain office supplies and communications equipment. I also received money from the C.I.A. to bribe Honduran journalists and broadcasters to write and speak favorably about the F.D.N. and to attack the Government of Nicaragua and call for its overthrow. Approximately 15 Honduran journalists and broadcasters were on the C.I.A.'s payroll, and our influence was thereby extended to every major Honduran newspaper and radio and television station. (I learned from my C.I.A. colleagues that the same tactic was employed in Costa Rica in an effort to turn the newspapers and radio and television stations of that country against the Nicaraguan Government). I worked very closely in all of these matters with several C.I.A. agents based in Tegucigalpa, but most

closely with one of the deputy station chiefs, named "George," who had drafted the F.D.N.'s first press statement in Miami and was then transferred to Tegucigalpa to continue working with us. Together with "George," and subject to his approval, I planned all the activities of my communications office and prepared a budget. The budget was reviewed by the C.I.A. station in Tegucigalpa and, if approved, sent to Washington to obtain the necessary funds, which were always provided to me in cash.

17. I was not the only member of the directorate to prepare a budget in this fashion. Indalecio Rodriguez, who was put in charge of "civilian affairs," which meant assistance for Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras or family members of our combatants, worked with his C.I.A. "adviser" in the same manner in which I worked with "George." Adolfo Calero and Enrique Bermudez worked on the military and logistics budget. This budget was not as large as one might suppose. The F.D.N. never received money to purchase arms, ammunition or military equipment. These were acquired for us and delivered directly to us by the C.I.A. One of the senior agents at the C.I.A.'s Tegucigalpa station, known to us as "the Colonel," was an expert in these matters, and he, together with his assistants, determined what we needed and obtained it for us, including: arms, ammunition, uniforms, boots, radio equipment, etc. As long as I was in Honduras (until June 1984), the F.D.N. never acquired its own arms, ammunition or other military equipment. We were just the end receivers. The main items in the military and logistics budget that Calero and Bermudez worked on were things that could be acquired locally, such as food for our men, for

which money had to be obtained from the C.I.A. Calero and Bermudez were our main links with the C.I.A. They met constantly with the C.I.A. station chief (whose name I cannot reveal here because I am uncertain whether it is his real name or a pseudonym) and his principal deputies.

18. Most of the C.I.A. operatives who worked with us in Honduras were military trainers and advisers. Our troops were trained in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, demolitions, and in the use of a variety of weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers and explosives, such as Claymore mines. We were also trained in field communications, and the C.I.A. taught us how to use certain sophisticated codes that the Nicaraguan Government forces would not be able to decipher. This was critical to our military operations because it enabled various units, or task forces, to communicate with each other, and to coordinate their activities, without being detected by the Sandinistas. Without this communications capacity, our forces inside Nicaragua would not have been able to coordinate their activities with one another and they would have been unable to launch effective strikes at the designated targets. Even more critical to our military activities was the intelligence that the C.I.A. provided to us. The C.I.A., working with United States military personnel, operated various electronic interception stations in Honduras for the purpose of intercepting radio and telephonic communications among Nicaraguan Government military units. By means of these interception activities, and by breaking the Nicaraguan Government codes, the C.I.A. was able to

determine -- and to advise us of -- the precise locations of all Nicaraguan Government military units. The information obtained by the C.I.A. in this manner was ordinarily corroborated by overflights of Nicaraguan territory by United States satellites and sophisticated surveillance aircraft. With this information, our own forces knew the areas in which they could safely operate free of government troops. If our units were instructed to do battle with the government troops, they knew where to set up ambushes, because the C.I.A. informed them of the precise routes the government troops would take. This type of intelligence was invaluable to us. Without it, our forces would not have been able to operate with any degree of effectiveness inside Nicaragua. The United States Government also made it possible for us to resupply our troops inside Nicaragua, thus permitting them to remain longer inside the country. Under cover of military maneuvers in Honduras during 1983, United States armed forces personnel constructed airstrips, including the one at Aguacate, that, after the C.I.A. provided us with airplanes, were instrumental in resupplying our troops.

19. The C.I.A. was also directly involved in our military tactics. The agency repeatedly ordered us to move our troops inside Nicaragua and to keep them there as long as possible. After our offensive at the end of 1982 was turned back, almost all of our troops were in Honduras and our own officers believed that they needed more training and more time before they would be ready to return to Nicaragua. The F.D.N. officers were overruled by the C.I.A., however. The agency told us that we had to move our men back into Nicaragua and keep fighting. We had no choice

but to obey. In 1983, the C.I.A. instructed us not to destroy farms or crops because that would be politically counterproductive. In 1984, however, we were instructed us to destroy export crops (especially coffee and tobacco), and to attack farms and cooperatives. Accordingly, we changed our tactics in 1984.

20. In July 1983, we were visited in Tegucigalpa by Duane Clarridge, the C.I.A. official, based in Washington, who was in charge of the agency's military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. At that time we were introduced to Clarridge as "Maroni." (I am free to state his real name because his identity has already been publicly disclosed in the United States). During a meeting with the political directorate, Clarridge told us that the C.I.A. had decided that something must be done to cut off Nicaragua's oil supplies, because without oil the Nicaraguan military would be immobilized and its capacity to resist our forces would be drastically reduced. Clarridge spoke of various alternatives. He said the Agency was considering a plan "to sink ships" bringing oil to Nicaragua, but that one problem with this plan was that if a ship belonging to the Soviet Union were sunk it could trigger a serious international incident. Clarridge said that the C.I.A. was also considering an attack on Nicaragua's sole oil refinery, located near Managua. According to Clarridge, however, the refinery was located in a densely populated area, and the civilian casualties resulting from such an attack would be politically counterproductive. Finally, Clarridge said that the Agency had decided on a plan to

attack the oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino, on Nicaragua's Pacific Coast, where the oil tankers delivering oil to Nicaragua discharge their cargo.

21. In September 1983, the C.I.A. blew up the pipeline at Puerto Sandino, just as Clarridge had advised us it would. The actual opertives were Agency employees of Hispanic descent, referred to within the Agency as "Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets" or UCLAs. These UCLAs, specially trained underwater demolitions experts, were despatched from a C.I.A. "mother ship" that took them to within striking distance of their target. Although the F.D.N. had nothing whatsoever to do with this operation, we were instructed by the C.I.A. to publicly claim responsibility in order to cover the C.I.A's involvement. We did. In October, C.I.A. UCLAs attacked Nicaragua's oil storage tanks at Corinto, also on the Pacific Coast. This was a combined sea and air attack involving the use of rockets. It was a complete success; all of the tanks were destroyed and enormous quantities of oil were consumed by fire. Again, the C.I.A. instructed us to publicly claim responsibility, and we did. Later in October, there was another UCLA attack on Puerto Sandino, which again resulted in the demolition of the oil pipeline. We again claimed responsibility per instructions from the C.I.A. Subsequently, the UCLAs attacked Nicaraguan Government military facilities at Potosi and radio antennas at Las Casitas. We again were told to claim responsibility and we did.

22. We had a second visit from Clarridge in October 1983. Clarridge told us that the Agency had decided that the F.D.N.

needed a single spokesman in order to more effectively persuade the Congress to continue supporting the C.I.A's activities against Nicaragua, and that Calero should be the one. He asked us to make Calero the head of the political directorate and we did so without objection. Clarridge also told us that the Agency wanted us to launch another major offensive with the objective of seizing and holding Nicaraguan territory, no matter how small. He said that as soon as our hold on that territory was secured, we should establish a provisional government, which the United States and its Central American allies would promptly recognize as th legitimate Government of Nicaragua.

23. The offensive was launched at the end of 1983, after the Congress had appropriated -- openly for the first time -- $24,000,000 to the C.I.A. for military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. While our forces inflicted greater casualties on the government's troops and on civilians, and destroyed more property than in previous attacks, we nevertheless failed to take or hold any Nicaraguan territory and the majority of our troops were forced to return to their bases in Honduras.

24. On January 5, 1984, at 2:00 a.m., the C.I.A. deputy station chief of Tegucigalpa, the agent I knew as "George," woke me up at my house in Tegucigalpa and handed me a press release in excellent Spanish. I was surprised to read that we -- the F.D.N. -- were taking credit for having mined several Nicaraguan harbors. "George" told me to rush to our clandestine radio station and read this announcement before the Sandinistas broke

the news. The truth is that we played no role in the mining of the harbors. But we did as instructed and broadcast the communique about the mining of the harbors. Ironically, approximately two months later, after a Soviet ship struck one of the mines, the same agent instructed us to deny that one of "our" mines had damaged the ship to avoid an international incident.

25. In May 1984 the United States Congress voted not to provide more assistance to the C.I.A. for military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua. Many of us became worried about receiving continued support from the United States Government and we expressed these concerns to our C.I.A. colleagues in Tegucigalpa. We were repeatedly assured by the station chief and his deputies, in the strongest possible terms, that we would not be abandoned and that the United States Government would find a way to continue its support. At around this time we were visited by Ronald F. Lehman II, a Special Assistant to the President of the United States who was serving then on the National Security Council. Mr. Lehman assured us that President Reagan remained committed to removing the Sandinistas from power. he told us that President Reagan was unable at that time to publicly express the full extent of his commitment to us because of the upcoming presidential elections in the United States. But, Mr. Lehman told us, as soon as the elections were over, President Reagan would publicly endorse our effort to remove the Sandinistas from power and see to it that we received all the support that was necessary for that purpose. We received a similar assurance of continued United States Government support, notwithstanding the refusal of the Congress

to appropriate more funds, from Lt. Col. Oliver North, another official of the National Security Council.

26. It was still important to these officials, and to the C.I.A., to obtain additional appropriations of funds from the Congress, and they had not abandoned hope that the Congress could be persuaded to resume funding our activities. Our C.I.A. colleagues enlisted us in an effort to "lobby" the Congress to resume these appropriations. I attended meetings at which C.I.A. officials told us that we could change the votes of many members of the Congress if we knew how to "sell" our case and place them in a position of "looking soft on Communism." They told us exactly what to say and which members of the Congress to say it to. They also instructed us to contact certain prominent individuals in the home districts of various members of Congress as a means of bring pressure on these members to change their votes. At various times Calero, Callejas, Zeledon, Salazar, Rodriguez and I participated in these "lobbying" activities.

27. A major part of my job as communications officer was to work to improve the image of the F.D.N. forces. This was challenging, because it was standard F.D.N. practice to kill prisoners and suspected Sandinista collaborators. In talking with officers in the F.D.N. camps along the Honduran border, I frequently heard offhand remards like, "Oh, I cut his throat." The C.I.A. did not discourage such tactics. To the contrary, the Agency severely criticized me when I admitted to the press that the F.D.N. had regularly kidnapped and executed agrarian reform workers and civilians. We were told that the only way to defeat

the Sandinistas was to use the tactics the Agency attributed to "Communist" insurgencies elsewhere: kill, kidnap, rob and torture.

28. These tactics were reflected in an operations manual prepared for our forces by a C.I.A. agent who used the name "John Kirkpatrick." I assisted "Kirkpatrick" in translating certain parts of the manual, and the manuscript was typed by my secretary. The manual was entitled: "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare." It advocated "explicit and implicit terror" against the civilian population, including assassination of government employees and sympathizers. Before the manual was distributed, I attempted to excise two passages that I thought were immoral and dangerous, at pages 70 and 71. One recommended hiring professional criminals. The other advocated killing some of our own colleagues to create martyrs for the cause. I did not particularly want to be "martyred" by the C.I.A. So I locked up all the copies of the manual and hired two youths to cut out the offending pages and glue in expurgated pages. About 2,000 copies of the manual, with only those two passages changed, were then distributed to F.D.N. troops. Upon reflection, I found many of the tactics advocated in the manual to be offensive, and I complained to the C.I.A. station cheif in Tegucigalpa. The station chief defended "Kirkpatrick" and the manual, and no action was ever taken in response to my complaints. In fact, the practices advocated in the manual were employed by F.D.N. troops. Many civilians were killed in cold blood. Many others were tortured, mutilated, raped, robbed or otherwise abused.

29. As time went on, I became more and more troubled by the

frequent reports I received of atrocities committed by our troops against civilians and against Sandinista prisoners. Calero and Bermudez refused to discuss the subject with me, so I went straight to our unit commanders as they returned from combat missions inside Nicaragua and asked them about their activities. I was saddened by what I was told. The atrocities I had heard about were not isolated incidents, but reflected a consistent pattern of behavior by our troops. There were unit commanders who openly bragged about their murders, mutilations, etc. When I questioned them about the propriety or wisdom of doing those things they told me it was the only way to win this war, that the best way to win the loyalty of the civilian population was to intimidate it and make it fearful of us. I complained to Calero and Bermudez, and to the C.I.A. station chief about these activities, but nothing was done to stop them. In June 1984, Clarridge visited us again. Although he was well aware of the terrorist tactics the F.D.N. troops were employing, he spoke warmly to Bermudez: "Well done, Colonel," I remember him saying, "Keep it up. Your boys are doing fine." It was the last time I saw him. Shortly thereafter, I acknowledged to a newspaper reporter that our troops had killed some civilians and executed some prisoners, though I tried to explain these practices as best I could. Calero told me I could no longer work in Honduras and I was reassigned to the local F.D.N. committee in Miami. I was ~~was~~ given nothing to do and I no longer had much interest in working for the F.D.N., or to be more accurate, for the C.I.A.

30. When I agreed to join the F.D.N. in 1981, I had hoped that it would be an organization of Nicaraguans, controlled by Nicaraguans, and dedicated to our own objectives which we ourselves would determine. I joined on the understanding that the United States Government would supply us the means necessary to defeat the Sandinistas and replace them as a government, but I believed that we would be our own masters. I turned out to be mistaken. The F.D.N. turned out to be an instrument of the United States Government and, specifically, of the C.I.A. It was created by the C.I.A., it was supplied, equipped, armed and trained by the C.I.A. and its activities -- both political and military -- were directed and controlled by the C.I.A. Those Nicaraguans who were chosen (by the C.I.A.) for leadership positions within the organization -- namely, Calero and Bermudez -- were those who best demonstrated their willingness to unquestioningly follow the instructions of the C.I.A. They, like the organization itself, became nothing more than executioners of the C.I.A.'s orders. The organization became so thoroughly dependent on the United States Government and its continued support that, if that support were terminated, the organization would not only be incapable of conducting any military or paramilitary activities against Nicaragua, but it would immediately begin to disintegrate. It could not exist without the support and direction of the United States Government.

31. I became more and more distanced from the F.D.N. in the second half of 1984. I had, for all intents and purposes, ceased to be a part of the organization. Finally, on November 20, 1984, I received a letter stating that the political directorate had

decided to relieve me of my duties. I made no protest.

32. My opposition to the Nicaraguan Government continues. I oppose its policies and programs and I would like to see it removed or replaced. This should be accomplished, however, by the Nicaraguan people themselves, and not by the United States Government or by its instruments, including the F.D.N., which follow its dictates and serve its interests instead of those of the Nicaraguan people. My presentation of this testimony to the International Court of Justice is not an expression of support or sympathy for the present Nicaraguan Government or its case against the United States. It is a result of my commitment to tell the truth, to all interested parties, about my personal experiences in the F.D.N. Since I left the organization at the end of 1984, I have spoken publicly in the United States about my experiences and I have made myself available to journalists whenever they have requested interviews. When Nicaragua's attorneys approached me and asked if I would present testimony about my experiences to the International Court of Justice, I decided to do so. This decision is consistent with my practice of speaking openly and honestly about my experiences before any interested body or forum. Whatever the best solution for the Nicaraguan people may be, I am convinced that it can only come

about on the basis of truth, and that those of us with relevant personal experience are under a moral obligation to make the truth known.

Edgar Chamorro
EDGAR CHAMORRO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of September 1985.

Hildred A Carney
Notary Public

My Commission Expires July 14, 1990